The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) has released its report into a train colliding with a buffer stop at Kirkby station, Merseyside, at around 18:53 on 13 March 2021.
The accident occurred at Kirkby station, to the north-east of Liverpool. The station acts as an interchange between Merseyrail services that operate in and around the Liverpool area, and the Northern services between Kirkby and Manchester Victoria, via Wigan Wallgate.
Kirkby station has two terminal platforms, one for each service, both equipped with buffer stops. Platform 1 serves Merseyrail trains and Platform 2 serves Northern trains. The two platforms are in line with each other but separated by a gap of around 20 metres.
A road bridge and separate footbridge go over the railway between the platforms at this gap. The southern abutment of the road bridge is close to the line of the railway, requiring a platform extension to provide a walkway between the two platforms that projects into the gap between the tracks. As a result, passengers walk behind both buffer stops to move between platforms.
The station sits in a cutting. The only access to both platforms is down either steps or a ramp from the ticket office, which is at road level. These initially give access to Platform 1, with access to Platform 2 being via the platform extension walkway under the bridges.
Collision
In its report on the accident, RAIB reported that, at around 18:53 on 13 March 2021, Merseyrail train 507006 was travelling at 41mph (66km/h) as it entered the platform. Soon afterwards, the driver applied the emergency brake, but there was insufficient distance remaining to prevent the collision, and the train struck the buffer stop at around 29mph (47km/h). It then struck the platform extension walkway that lies under the bridge and between the two platforms.
One second before the collision with the buffer stop, internal CCTV shows the driver vacating the driving cab and moving into the saloon of the first vehicle.
A short circuit was created between the conductor rail and running rail, causing the traction supply circuit breakers to trip and an alarm to be sent to the Sandhills electrical control operator. The train came to rest under a bridge, around 28 metres beyond the original buffer stop position and nine metres from the buffer stop on the line used by Northern trains on Platform 2.
The driver was taken to hospital as a precaution and was discharged the following day. There were no other reported injuries to the guard or to the 12 passengers on board.
The collision caused significant damage to the station infrastructure and the front of the train, with the station remaining closed for eight days, reopening for passenger service on 21 March 2021..
The RAIB report concludes that the accident occurred because the driver of the train did not apply the brakes in time as he was distracted from the driving task. This distraction was prolonged in nature and the driver’s full attention did not seem to be brought back to the driving task despite cues from familiar lineside landmarks and the AWS (automatic warning system). The driver was distracted as he was using his mobile telephone while driving the train and he had left the driving seat to retrieve the contents of his bag, which had fallen on the cab floor.
No engineered systems automatically applied the train’s brakes, as the conditions for their intervention were not met. The driver continued to operate the controls for two of these systems (the automatic warning system and the driver’s safety device), preventing their activation, despite not being entirely engaged in the driving task.
Two pairs of overspeed sensor system (OSS) loops protect the platform at Kirkby. The first is designed to intervene should a train pass the loops at a speed equal to or greater than 53mph (85km/h). When the train passed these loops, it was travelling at 42mph (68 m/h), so no brake demand was triggered.
The second OSS sensors are installed to mitigate against a slow speed misjudgement by a driver and assumes that a defensive driving approach is used. As such, it is designed to minimise the consequences of a buffer stop collision for trains approaching at speeds of up to 20mph (32km/h). The train involved in this accident, however, passed the OSS at 39mph (63km/h). While this triggered a TPWS (train protection and warning system) brake demand, this had no effect as the driver had already made an emergency brake application.
RAIB found that the risk assessment processes used by Merseyrail and Network Rail did not identify the risk of the buffer stop being hit at relatively high speed. RAIB also observed that Merseyrail’s fatigue risk management procedure did not follow current industry good practice.
The report notes that this accident would almost certainly have had a worse outcome if there had been more passengers on the train or in the platform area behind the buffer stop. At the time, the COVID-19 pandemic had led to restrictions on social contact which resulted in a reduction in passenger numbers.
In the 35 years before this accident, there had been at least three previous buffer stop collisions at Kirkby station with photographs and news articles showing collisions in 1987, 1991 and 1997, before the installation of TPWS. The photographs of the aftermath of these collisions suggest that the speed of impact in each accident was likely to have been similar to the speed of impact of the 2021 accident. Witness evidence from some long‑serving Merseyrail staff suggests that low adhesion was a causal factor in the 1997 accident.
Recommendations
RAIB made three recommendations in its report. The first is addressed to RSSB and relates to research into devices to monitor the alertness and awareness of drivers. The second, addressed to Merseyrail and Network Rail, seeks to improve the risk assessment process for collisions with buffer stops at terminal platforms. The final recommendation asks Merseyrail to improve its fatigue management process to follow industry good practice.
RAIB also identified two learning points. The first reminds train drivers of the risks posed by using a mobile phone while driving a train. The second reminds train operating companies of the importance of understanding the limits of protection offered by the train protection and warning system when risks assessing terminal platforms.
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